Abstract: Efficient (Pareto optimal) flow control in a multiclass telecommunications environment is analysed. Several classes of users compete for the resources provided by an exponential server, using power as their performance criterion. The necessary and sufficient conditions that the throughputs of the different classes have to satisfy are presented. Relations with definitions of global performance measures are analysed. Several algorithms that converge to efficient points are considered.
Introduction
Dynamic sharing of resources is the main feature of a packet switched network. Network resources are not dedicated to a certain user for an entire session but are shared by a community of competing users. Uncontrolled sharing of these resources may, however, result in congestion, when the throughput of the network becomes almost zero and delays increase to unacceptable levels. In addition, there is a need to optimise the use of network resources not only for better utilisation but also to guarantee an acceptable level of service for all users, otherwise known as dynamic bandwidth allocation. Hence, to prevent undesirable behaviour as well as to optimise performance, flow control is introduced. The problem of flow control in a telecommunications network is important from the point of view of network resource utilisation as well as for the performance of each individual user/class. Traditionally, the problem of flow control has been addressed in the context of networks with one class of customers. The main emphasis has been on characterisation of the structure of optimal policies given a performance criterion [l, 23. Kleinrock and Gerla 131
provide an overview of the subject. In the integrated network environment in addition to voice, video and data traffic there are also other traffic classes which arise like control traffic carrying information. This leads to an environemnt where multiple classes of traffic and many users compete for fixed network resources and, depending on the objective may apply flow control on either a class by class or a per user basis. However, since all classes might not have a common performance objective the problem is now one of multiple criteria optimisation. How is an optimal point defined? What are the necessary information structures that result in a certain operating point?
The existence of multiple objectives makes the definition of a global optimum solution difficult. The notion of efficiency or Pareto optimality [4] provides a set of solutions which have an intuitively satisfactory property. According to this idea, in a multi-objective criterion optimisation problem a solution is optimal if there is no other solution that could simultaneously improve the performance of all the objectives. However, in the multiple classes and users environment an infinite number of Pareto optimal points exist.
In the computer communications area Yemini and
Kleinrock 151 were the first to address the multiobjective nature of the flow control problem. They noted that previously known optimal allocations of transmitting probabilities in broadcast networks are Pareto optimal. Yemini [ 6 ] also proposed Pareto optimality as the correct concept for optimal flow control. Kurose et al. [7] presented an algorithm based on competition and pricing for choosing optimal parameters for multiple access protocols in broadcast networks. Micro-economic concepts that lead to Pareto optimality were applied to CPU balancing and file allocation 181. Sharing of resources in Pareto optimal sense has been studied by Courcoubetis [9] . Pareto optimality was also defined as the correct type of optimality for load balancing in computer systems [lo] and flow control in computer networks [I 11.
In this paper, the necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality for flow control in a computer networks setting where several classes of users compete for the resources of a given channel are found, represented in our system by an exponential server with service rate p. The conflicting objectives inherent in each class are incorporated in the use of power, defined as the weighted ratio of throughput over average delay, as the performance measure to be optimised.
The nonuniqueness of the Pareto optimal solutions presents us with the problem of the definition of a global performance measure. The problem of designing algorithms that converge to the Pareto optimal points also needs to be faced. Two different sets of algorithms can be defined. The first set is comprised of algorithms that exploit the Nash equilibrium as a starting point. The second set exploits properties of the cost function to reach a Pareto optimal point without the need for the Nash equilibrium. These algorithms only guarantee the convergence to a Pareto optimal point rather than a specific one which might result if some global performance The interplay between throughput and average delay in a communications environment is captured in the notion of power which is defined as follows: to the power function. Thus P(y) is the power of the system.
In the following Section the Pareto optimal set will be characterised when power is used as the performance criterion. A communications link is considered with service rate p and n classes of customers attempting to use its resources (see Fig. 1 In the study of single objective optimisation problems the derivative of the objective function has to be 0 at the optimum point. The determinant of the Jacobian is a key element in the study of multi-objective optimisation problems when the cost function is differentiable [13] . In order to characterise the Pareto optimal set, calculation of the determinant of the Jacobian is necessary. The equivalent conditions provided by the following lemma are essential for the proof of the main result of Section 3.
Lemma I: The following conditions are equivalent:
where det (SP/Sy) is the determinant of the Jacobian of P = ( P , , . . ., P.) with respect to y = ( y l , . .., y. )
Proof: See the Appendix.
The following theorem presents the main result of this Section, i.e. the characterisation of the Pareto optimal set through the weighting factors and the service rate.
Theorem I : A necessary and sufficient condition for a n-tuple y* = (y: , y ; , . . . , y,*) of throughputs to be Pareto optimal is
Proof: The necessary condition is that it is enough to show that the set y* defined by eqn. 1 is the only set that achieves det (9P/9y) = 0 [I31 which is a direct consequence of the previous lemma and the fact that we are searching for an admissible set of throughputs.
The sufficient condition is as follows:
Note that for every i , j = 1, 2, ..., n and " "
Thus any change from the points y* given by eqn. 1 will not increase the power of any class, without decreasing the power of some other, i.e. the set y* is a Pareto optimal set.
In Fig Theorem 1 identifies the points where each user cooperates with the others to achieve a performance so that if any other solution is used at least one of the users is penalised, in the sense that its performance deteriorates. Therefore there is no notion of a global or a system optimum. The Pareto optimal points given in theorem 1 may also maximise this system power in special cases.
It is difficult to define a system of global power. Three versions of system or global power have been presented by Kadaba and Jaffe [14] . The rest of this section identifies important connections between the points that maximise these global power functions and Pareto optimal points.
The following corollary provides the results for the case when all users have the same weighting factor on throughput and connects with a blocking procedure presented in [lS] .
Corollary 1 : If . . , , y t ) is a Pareto optimal solution iff = B2 = . . = Bn = P, then y* = pi:, y:,
If the system power is given by P , , where y is the total throughput and D(y) the average system time delay, then the Pareto optimal point given by eqn. 2 maximises the system power. A blocking procedure to achieve a system optimal point has been presented 1151. Packets from all classes are blocked probabilistically independently of their class and are then queued to be served. This probabilistic blocking gives a set of admissible throughputs, which is both a Pareto optimal solution and a system optimum point. The throughputs achieved by this kind of blocking are proportional to the arrival rates of each class of users.
If we define the total power as P b , i,e, the system power is the sum of the powers of each class, then the following holds. A more general but weaker result is given by the following corollary. where values of wi are positive constants, that give the weight of each power. Then if P* = (P:, P z , . . ., P;) maximises the total system power, P* is a Pareto optimal set of powers.
This result holds for more general cost criteria and network configurations. Nevertheless, one has to be careful when using the weighted sum as not all Pareto optimal points can be obtained by such a method [16] .
From eqn. 1 and Fig. 2 , it can be seen that at certain Pareto optimal points the throughput and/or the power of some of the classes can be very low, even equal to zero at the extreme points of the set. This leads to the conclusion that the Pareto optimality of a solution may not be able to give a satisfactory solution, if considered alone. In certain applications we may need to put more constraints on the set of optimal solutions than the ones specified by the Pareto optimality. The issue of 'fairness' between the various classes is possibly one of these additional requirements. We may not want a certain class to achieve a power or a throughput that is orders of magnitude greater than that of the other classes. In this case the set of admissible points will be a subset of the set of Pareto optimal points. Another restriction could come from the fact that each class might have a desirable power to achieve, in which case we should operate at the Pareto optimal point that minimises the deviations from the desired operating point. The third notion of system power P , provides several of these desirable characteristics as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 : The system power defined as the product of individual powers in the M/M/l case has a unique extremum point, which is a maximisation point. This is also a Pareto optimal point with individual throughputs y f , i = 1, 2, . . ., n given by -ah, . ' . ah. is indeed the weight a user puts on its throughput. The Nash equilibrium point has been proven to be [I71 Comparing the Nash equilibrium point to the Pareto point given by eqn. 3, we see that each user agrees to lower its throughput for the common good which is the system optimisation. So, instead of the unity in the denominator there is a n. In [lS] the product of powers was introduced for equalisation of throughputs especially when there is a bottle-neck link. In [ 6 ] and [14] the product of powers was chosen as an appropriate fair flow control objective. A study of fairness in a communications environment based on the Nash arbitration scheme was carried out [19] and it was shown that the point that maximises the product of powers criterion is a unique fair point for a Jackson loop-free network.
A more general result can be proved for the product of the individual performance objectives if they are twice differentiable.
Proposition 2: Any extremum or inflexion point of the system performance defined as the product of individual performance objectives is a Pareto optimal point. Having identified and completely characterised the set of Pareto optimal points and having observed the Pareto optimality of several global performance measures, the existence of algorithms that converge to such points is now shown. Special attention is paid to algorithms that require as little information as possible on the state of the system and the performance objectives of the other users, as well as algorithms that converge to Pareto optimal points that optimise one of the proposed global objectives.
Structural algorithms
Cansever 1207 exploiting several properties of the cost function, proved that under relatively general conditions all users can be better off compared to the Nash equilibrium if they reduce their throughputs. An algorithm was presented that led to a Pareto optimal point. In the sequel we will call this algorithm, algorithm 1. The main assumptions underlying this algorithm are (a) hi(. , .) is twice continuously differentiable in its (b) %A., Di(y))/ay, > 0 ; and ahAui, .)/aD, < 0 (c) hi is strictly concave in its arguments ul, u 2 , . . . , U,.
arguments
We present a general description of the algorithm as well as a modification to this algorithm.
Algorithm 1 : Start from the Nash equilibrium point and update sequentially between the two users by reducing the individual throughputs by a constant E till a certain nonnegativity relationship between the partial derivatives of the performance objective with respect to the throughputs and the delays are satisfied.
Details of the algorithm can be found in Cansever [20] . In most cases the Pareto optimal point is not unique, but there is a set of points that are Pareto optimal. Algorithm l converges to one of these points. At this point all users have an equal distance from the Nash equilibrium point and achieve a greater power than the one at the Nash equilibrium. By reducing their throughputs they achieve a better tradeoff between throughput and time delay expressed as a larger value for their performance objective. By a slight modification of the algorithm a whole set of Pareto optimal points can be reached. This modification consists of choosing different E~, i = 1, 2 for each user and running the algorithm. These Pareto points correspond to operating points where each user is better off compared with the Nash equilibrium but the throughputs at these points are not equally distanced from the throughputs at the Nash equilibrium. We call this extension to algorithm 1, algorithm 2.
The following proposition establishes the convergence properties of algorithm 2.
Proposition 4 :
If the same assumptions as in algorithm 1 hold, then algorithm 2 converges to a point (yl, j 2 ) . which is Pareto optimal and at this point each user is better off compared to the Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
The proof follows similar lines as the proof of convergence of Algorithm 1 and is omitted. Algorithm 2, apart from giving a set of Pareto optimal points rather than a single point, is also attractive because there is no need for users to have the same step size E. A graphical interpretation of both algorithms is given below in the context of the single server queueing system.
The motivation behind algorithm 1 and its extension in algorithm 2 was its potential usage in a virtual circuit environment with power as the performance criterion. For the case of the single link shared by n users the power of user i is given by where yl. y 2 , ..., y. are the throughputs of the users, ,U the service rate and pi the weighting factor.
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If pi = 1 for all i, it can be easily checked that power satisfies all the assumptions of algorithm 1. But for pi > 1 concavity is no longer present as the following counter example shows.
Example: Consider the case of two users sharing the resources of an exponential server of rate p.
If 8 , > 1, then for y 1 > (U, -l k -y2))/v1 + l)Pl is concave and is convex otherwise. A similar result can be obtained for the n-users case.
The nonconcavity of the power function for pi > 1 does not allow the use of algorithms 1 and 2 to achieve a Pareto optimal point. Nevertheless, having characterised the Nash equilibrium point and the Pareto optimal set we are able to propose algorithms that do not require concavity of the cost function. Proposition 3 is essential for these algorithms.
Once the structure of the Pareto optimal set and the position of the Nash equilibrium with respect to that set are known, we can propose an algorithm similar to algorithms 1 and 2, that starts from the Nash equilibrium and converges to a Pareto point without having to satisfy all the conditions that algorithms 1 and 2 have to satisfy. Algorithm 3: Starting from the Nash equilibrium point users reduce their throughputs by small amounts E~, i = 1, . . . , n until they reach the Pareto optimal set.
The above algorithm provides a Pareto optimal point with the property that all users are better off compared to the Nash equilibrium point. Algorithm 3 is almost identical to algorithm 2 except for the terminating condition, which now does not depend on the concavity of the cost function but on the 'structure' of the Pareto optimal set. Points close to the Nash equilibrium could also be used as starting points as long as the starting point is on the same side as the Nash point. From the geometry of the optimal points and their relevant position in the space of admissible throughputs it can be seen that algorithm 3 always converges to nonzero throughputs. From  Figs. 3 and 4 we can see that the Pareto optimal points that algorithms 2 and 3 converge to belong to the segment AB or the triangle ABC for the cases of 2 and 3 users respectively.
The proposed algorithms 1-3, have the desirable characteristic that all users are better off compared to the Nash point (see also theorem 1 of 1201) but this point has to be reached first in order to proceed to the execution of the algorithm. Convergence to the Nash equilibrium is not always possible in a finite number of steps and thus only algorithm 3 seems to be particularly robust as regards the exact choice of the initial point, a desirable property for any iterative algorithm. The fact that the space is divided in two subspaces by the pareto optimal set with the properties shown in proposition 3 suggests a rather robust algorithm that converges to an efficient point but that does not guarantee a nonzero throughput for all users. The main feature of this algorithm is its independence from the calculation of the Nash equilibrium. However, the algorithm proposed for the calculation of the Nash equilibrium could be used to obtain a starting point that would be closer to the Nash equilibrium and most probably would not lead to any zero throughputs for any of the users. Another natural choice of starting point is the point where each user maximises its own power regardless of the presence of the other users. Even though the proposed algorithms lead to a pareto optimal point, they are closely related to the Nash equilibrium or to the structure of the optimal set. Algorithm 4 can converge to a zero throughput for one or more of the users an undesirable fact in most applications. Algorithms that converge to nonzero throughputs and maximise the product of individual powers are presented in the next section.
Product of powers based algorithms
Having shown the existence of a point which is Pareto optimal and which simultaneously maximises the system power, the next question to be asked is if we can find an algorithm that starting from an arbitrary initial point could reach this optimum. Decentralisability is a desir-IEE PROCEEDINGS-I, Vol. 138, No. 6 , DECEMBER 1991 able property of the algorithm, i.e. when updating each user should only use the throughputs of the other users and the knowledge of its own cost criterion. does not depend on the weighting factors of the other users and that it solely depends on the rates of the other users and its own weighting factor -a necessary property for decentralisability.
Using the above observation, a decentralised Pareto optimal flow control algorithm is proposed, that converges to a point that maximises the product of the individual powers. According to this algorithm each user updates by using the most recent information that is readily available.
Users are labelled 1, 2, . . . , n and update in this order Let a admissible cy:, . . . , y f ) be any starting point At step k user i updates its throughput as follows
The similarity of this algorithm to the greedy algorithm analysed in References 14 and 17 should be noted. Both algorithms operate synchronously and use information that is available locally. The difference between the two lies in the selection of the criterion that each user optimises at each update. In the greedy algorithm each user optimized its own utility function, hence the adjective 'greedy'. Here each user maximises the system performance. Nevertheless, the structure of the two algorithms is very similar, the only difference being the substitution of + 1) by BJVi + n). Thus, the conclusions drawn regarding the greedy algorithm, hold for the Pareto optimal algorithm (eqn. 5). First the algorithm (eqn. 5 ) converges to the Pareto optimal point, that maximises the product of individual powers [21] . Secondly, the algorithm can be run asynchronously. Convergence of an asynchronous version of the algorithm is not guaranteed for all values of Di . The range of values of pi for which the asynchronous algorithm converges is larger than that of the asynchronous version of the greedy algorithm because of the existence of the term BJVi + 4.
We are now in a position to comment on the discussion on decentralisability of the flow control power as presented by Jaffe [24] . The requirement that each user optimise its own cost criterion constitutes a noncooperative solution and leads to the Nash equilibrium. If some form of global optimality is required co-operation is essential and we have shown that we can achieve optimum solutions in a decentralisable way. The fact that the nonco-operative solution is not the same as the cooperative one is well known in game theory [25] . It is only under very specific situations that such an equality occurs.
Toll based algorithm:
From the characterisation of the Nash equilibrium point and the Pareto optimal points it can be easily seen that the Nash equilibrium achieves a higher throughput while penalising the performance of the system. If we could allow for a penalty on the cost of each user that would depend on its throughput we might be able to achieve an efficient operating point. This does not mean that the cost structure of the system as it is perceived by an outsider is modified but only that the updating process of the greedy algorithm for each user, must be more conservative with respect to its throughput. An approach due to Leeman [26] , led to the consideration of the possibility of achieving 'social' optimality through the imposition of tolls for newly arrived customers. Naor [27] and Yechiali [28] advanced the proposed idea from the qualitative characterisation of the problem to a quantitative analysis. In the transportation and traffic flow literature [29] the imposition of tolls has been used to reach a system optimum through a user optimising strategy. This is based in the reasoning that by slightly charging each user with a penalty or toll that is a function of its throughput it might be possible to obtain satisfactory operating points using a user optimising strategy. which is precisely the point that maximises the product of powers, i.e. a Pareto optimal point.
Conclusions
Pareto optimal (eficient) flow control was analysed in a communications environment. The set of Pareto optimal throughputs was identified. Several previously proposed global performance measures were analysed in light of their Pareto optimality. The product of individual objec-
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tives was shown to have many desirable characteristics for a fair allocation of resources. Two classes of algorithms were analysed. Structured algorithms exploited the structure of the Pareto optimal set to reach the equilibrium point. Algorithms that used the Nash equilibrium point as a starting point were proposed as well as algorithms that do not need the Nash equilibrium as a starting point. A second class involves algorithms that are based on the optimality of the product of powers. Two algorithms were proposed and their convergence was discussed in relation to the convergence of algorithms used in the Nash equilibrium case. The extension of the above results to more general networks and analysis of the decentralisability and speed of convergence of the proposed algorithms are currently under investigation. 
